





Copyright @ 2017 
Australia and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
Vol9 (2) 
ISSN 1837-2147 (Print) 
ISSN 1836-1803 (On-line) 
Historical Lessons for Australia's Foreign Policy: The Case 
of British EEC Membership 
Nina Markovic Khaze 
Visiting Fellow 




The Australian Government's attitudes towards major events in international politics such as the UK's 
entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in the past and Brexit negotiations today, carry 
greater weight than previously assumed in political science literature. Australia was critical of 
the EEC (now called the European Union, EU) in the early 1960s, when its then most important 
trading partner, the United Kingdom (UK) first applied for membership. Australia was ill-prepared 
to deal with the repercussions from Britain's entry into the EU, as Australian foreign policy was 
heavily influenced by local as well as international anti-EEC attitudes. This paper will analyse political 
debates in Australia during the 1960s and early 1970s with reference to parliamentary Hansard 
records and newspaper articles in order to suggest a new framework for Australian foreign policy 
analysis. 
Keywords: Australian foreign policy, Australia-United Kingdom relations, Brexit, the 
Commonwealth 
Introduction 
This paper argues that the future of Australia’s relations with the EU-27 and Great 
Britain in particular, as in the 1960s and 1970s, will be closely related to Australia's 
efforts to prepare its citizens for Brexit. Issues of immigration, trade and identity 
politics are currently high on the Australian Government’s agenda when dealing with 
these interlocutors, as are discourses related to domestic politics. The Australian 
Government's efforts to conclude and ratify Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the EU 
and the UK (which fall within the Coalition Government's broader agenda that pushes 
for FTAs globally) would need to be supplemented with a clear and publicly available 
strategy for Australian citizens to deal with emerging issues before Brexit negotiations 
are concluded. Protecting Australian interests abroad is, after all, a major aim of 
Australian foreign policy. Failure to do so might produce a similar result to that of the 
mid-1970s when it became evident that the Australian Government's one-sided 
strategy (of lobbying against UK's membership) directly damaged Australian primary 
export industries, many of which never fully recovered.  
One possible explanation for Australia's failure to prepare its export industry for an 





the close and 'special' relationship between the UK and Australia during the 1960s, as 
well as Australia's international lobbying against UK's EEC membership, would 
counter any negative consequences. This was not the case in reality. Another possible 
explanation is that the political bickering resulting from a very contentious election 
year in Australia, which was also the year in which Britain concluded its EEC 
membership negotiations (1972), distracted both the Australian electorate and public 
service from focusing on the domestic consequences from events in the international 
political realm. This paper aims to expand the knowledge of what political scientist 
Robert Putnam calls a 'two-level game' by national governments, which try to cater for 
the international realm, whilst focusing on domestic audiences in their discourses, 
including in the foreign policy realm.1  
Domestic politics as a 'distraction' for the foreign policy realm 
The Federal Government's short-sighted policy in the 1960s of pursuing its preferred 
policy rhetoric rather than of preparing for a potentially opposite outcome, harmed the 
prospects of the Australian export industry in relation to the UK’s successful bid to join 
the European Economic Community (EEC). The Government's stubborn anti-EEC 
attitude may have misled the public by not appropriately dealing with the potential loss 
of Australia's largest export market at a policy level, even when it became increasingly 
evident that the UK was on the path of joining Denmark and the Republic of Ireland to 
attain EEC membership. The 1960s was an era in Australian political 
history when Canberra and London co-operated closely on trade, defence and security 
matters, but drifted apart in their respective foreign policy outlooks towards Western 
European integration.  
UK membership of the EEC from 1 January 1973, therefore, brought about a radical 
transformation of Australia’s international outlook. It represented a profound and 
uncomfortable shock for most Australians. 2  This single event influenced negative 
attitudes of Australian policy-makers and diplomats towards the EEC for many years 
to come. However, this rude awakening coincided with a major change in Australia’s 
domestic political landscape which distracted the government and prevented a viable 
response to a major international development. Only a month earlier Gough Whitlam 
led the Australian Labour Party to victory after the Liberal Party’s unbroken twenty-
two year reign. Although various Australian export industries had at least a decade to 
prepare for the eventuality of the UK’s success in acquiring membership of the EEC, 
the Federal Government's failure to deal with that scenario at the policy level had 
negative repercussions. One immediate consequence was a huge drop in exports and 
the loss of revenue which burdened both the Australian Government and export 
industry for many years afterwards. Another consequence was an acrimonious 
relationship with the expanded EEC, particularly in the area of agriculture and 
international trade negotiations. This paper argues that there are some major lessons 
to be learned from that historical period for Australian foreign policy analysis. 
Australia may again lose out in the current period of Brexit negotiations unless it 
prepares through reform and improved foreign policy foresight. 
																																																								
1 Putnam, Robert. ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’. International 
Organization 42 (1988): 427–460. 
2 The first major change in Australia’s post-war foreign policy was the forging of the ANZUS alliance with the 
United States of America and New Zealand in 1951, which confirmed the primacy of the United States as 
Australia’s principal ally in wartime. This shifted the primary focus of Australian defence policy from the UK to 
the US.  
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First British EU application (1961) and Australian political 
discourses 
On 19 March 1957, the then Governor-General of Australia, Sir William J. Slim, 
cautioned about protectionist consequences for Australia from a nascent European 
supra-national project, which was to become the European Community:  
Over the past year … the six countries of the European coal and steel community 
have carried forward their plans for the formation of a customs and economic 
union. The United Kingdom has entered upon negotiations for a free trade area 
which would bring her, and perhaps other countries of Europe, into association 
with the common market of the six. Such far-reaching changes could have 
important implications for the Australian economy and these developments are 
being kept under close review.3 
Yet even though the top tier of Australian policy-makers was alarmed by the prospect 
of a British EEC application, no structural adjustment took place in foreign and trade 
policy orientation for a good part of the next decade. The UK Government first applied 
for membership in the European Economic Community only three years after Harold 
Macmillan, the first serving British Prime Minister ever to visit Australia, reaffirmed 
the strength of bilateral relations between Australia and the UK. During his visit, a new 
social services agreement was concluded, which entered into force on 1 April 1958. This 
was important as Australia launched the post-war ‘Bring-a-Briton’ assisted 
immigration scheme, which meant that growing numbers of UK citizens were moving 
to Australia, and social services was an important aspect of bilateral relationship. 
During Macmillan’s visit, the Governor-General of Australia stated:  
The visit of the RH Harold Macmillan ...has evidenced and strengthened our 
practical unity with the United Kingdom. ...While our ties with the United 
Kingdom, and with the Commonwealth of Nations, have been strengthened, we 
have demonstrated further our neighbourly interest in Asian development.4 
At that time, Australia and the UK cooperated closely in the defence sector, with 
Australia offering, as a matter of then top-secret intelligence, terrain for the UK’s 
testing of nuclear weapons from 1952 to 1963. 5  Furthermore, despite Australia’s 
emerging interest in developing closer ties within its neighbours (as demonstrated in 
the aforementioned quote) Australia’s political, economic and industry leaders were 
dismayed when the British formally applied for membership in the six-nation 
European Community. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced this 
decision on 31 July 1961 in the House of Commons.6 The Australian Prime Minister, 
Robert Menzies, recognised the significance of the British decision to apply for EEC 
membership. After visiting London in mid-1962, Menzies observed that Australian 
																																																								
3 Australian Parliament, ‘Governor-General’s speech’, 19 March 1957, House Hansard, Commonwealth of 
Australia, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2
F1957-03-19%2F0010%22 (accessed online 21 June 2017). 
4 House of Representatives, ‘Governor-General’s speech’, 25 February 1958, pp. 1, 4, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2
F1958-02-25%2F0024%22 (accessed online 20 June 2017). 
5 National Museum of Australia, ‘Robert Menzies’, http://www.nma.gov.au/primeministers/robert_menzies 
(accessed online 20 June 2017). 





exports most likely to suffer as a result of the UK’s EEC accession were sugar, lead, 
dairy products, meat, dried fruits and canned fruit. 7  This demonstrates that the 
Australian top decision-makers were well-aware of the dangers to the Australian 
economy, yet did little to initiate a transition process. Their one-sided, anti-EEC and 
pro-imperial attitudes and rhetoric may well have impeded the transition.  
At the September 1962 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Menzies joined 
other Commonwealth leaders in expressing his displeasure with the British decision. 
Menzies believed that the Commonwealth nations would be weakened should the 
imperial preferences system between the UK and Commonwealth nations be 
abolished.8 His comments in late 1961 and the first half of 1962 regarding the British 
EEC application were carefully measured without open criticism, and intensified on 
the negative side only after he faced heavy domestic criticism for not being direct about 
the issue.9 This demonstrates that established domestic political practices, such as the 
general rule not to criticise the UK as a major partner in public, also played a role in 
the Australian Government's lack of preparation for the UK's potential EEC 
membership. Any such preparation could have been interpreted potentially as a sign 
of disloyalty towards the British.  
Public statements by Menzies more openly questioning the British decision to join the 
EEC from the second part of 1962 onwards were at odds with the Prime Minister’s 
previously stated position (in 1958) that Australia not disagree in public with the 
decisions made by its great and powerful friends:  
Australia was an independent nation, but truly independent only in the legal 
sense as its security was bound up with the security of others and with their 
beliefs about Australia’s goodwill and responsibility. …But when you cannot live 
without your friends you do not argue with them or disagree with them in public. 
You resolve your differences in private.10 
It was obvious that the stark differences between the UK and Australia on this issue 
would resound widely. From 1962 onwards, representations on Australia’s behalf were 
made by many sectors of the Australian Government, parliamentary and business 
groups. An article from the Canberra Times of 1962 observed a developing crisis within 
the Federal Government’s ranks on the issue of ‘magnitude of the repercussions if 
Australia loses its British trade preferences’.11 Its first ‘victim’ was the Minister for Air, 
Les Bury, who was sacked in July 1962 following his comments which referred to 
‘exaggerated threats’ for Australia if Britain was to join the EEC.12 His view deeply 
conflicted with that of the Leader of the then Country Party, Sir John McEwen, who 
was Minister for Trade and Industry.13 The Country Party was vehemently opposed to 
																																																								
7 ‘Menzies renews market warning’, Canberra Times, 10 August 1962, p. 1. These fears were proven true as 
Australia’s butter exports were slashed by 90 per cent in the years following British accession to the EEC. 
8 National Archives of Australia, ‘Robert Menzies in office’, 
http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/menzies/in-office.aspx (accessed online 20 June 2017). 
9 See, for example, E.W. Campbell, ‘Menzies silent on sell out of Australia’, Tribune, 29 November 1961, p. 10. 
10 ‘Security first, says Menzies’, Canberra Times, 31 July 1958, p. 3. 
11 ‘Cabinet crisis on trade view conflict’, Canberra Times, 27 July 1962, p. 1.  
12 Ibid. 
13 MP Ian Sinclair (Leader of the National Party of Australia), ‘Death of Hon. L.H.E. Bury, CMG’, Hansard, House 
of Representatives, No. 150, 1986, 16 September 1986, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F198
6-09-16%2F0010%22 (accessed online 20 June 2017). 
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the British EEC application as early as at 1961, but collectively these parties did little 
to inform industry about how best to prepare for the loss of the British market.  
The Menzies Government became extremely sensitive about this issue as the time went 
on.14 The agricultural sector was particularly vulnerable to any changes in the Imperial 
Trade Preferences system for the Commonwealth countries, which above all accorded 
certainty to Australian producers in terms of market access and distribution channels. 
If the British were to join the EEC, the Australian Government officials argued, 
Australian businesses would be, as an immediate consequence, locked out of the EEC’s 
trade market; lose special status in trading with the British, and consequently suffer 
financial losses that the government would have to compensate. However, the 
Government could have done much more to prepare industry for the UK's EEC entry 
and find new ways of trading and markets which eventually it had to do anyway but 
with grave consequences for many established exporters. 
The Labor opposition also verbally argued against the British EEC application, but did 
little to suggest how this shift could be managed in practice. They offered no alternative 
policy on this issue. A member of the Australian Labor Party and Member of the House 
of Representatives for Blacktown, A. Dennis, for example said in the week leading up 
to the UK’s formal application to join the EEC that ‘Australia’s standard of living would 
be threatened by any sudden stoppage of trade with Great Britain’.15  Some minor 
parties were also vocal on the issue of Britain’s EEC application. Australia’s Communist 
Party, which Prime Minister Menzies sought to ban (unsuccessfully), accused the 
Federal Government of compliance with the British to the detriment of national 
economic interests because of a geo-political agenda.16 
Australia’s top level government reluctance to voice its rejection of the British EEC 
application earlier on could be in part explained by its support for anti-communist 
drives globally and in Europe specifically, and the fact that successive U.S. 
administrations (under both the Eisenhower and Kennedy presidencies) were strongly 
supportive of the first British EEC application. 17  The ANZUS alliance between 
Australia, the U.S. and New Zealand in 1951 was the cornerstone of Australia’s post-
war foreign policy and was Menzies’ most important initiative. The Government’s anti-
communist drive in foreign policy that followed alliance commitments, therefore, was 
also partly responsible for Australia's real lack of preparation for British EEC 
membership. 
By the spring of 1961, as academics Deighton and Ludlow argue, ‘the Americans had 
bluntly informed the British’ that they should try to join the EEC and ‘help to create a 
united Western Europe’ against growing influence of the Communist regimes.18 This 
was taking place at the time of growing tensions between the West and the Soviet 
Union over the status of military forces in West Berlin, amongst other contentious 
																																																								
14 By contrast, Australia is today criticised in Europe for voicing what it seems like an enthusiasm for forging a 
new trade deal with the UK. Australia’s foreign policy pragmatism is at display here and government will need to 
engage in negotiations with both the EU and the UK concurrently.  
15 ‘Warns on trade plans’, Cumberland Argus, 26 July 1961, p. 7. 
16 ‘Security first, says Menzies’, op. cit. 
17 ‘Headaches in the Common Market’, Tribune, 21 June 1961, page 2. 
18 Anne Deighton and Piers Ludlow, ‘A conditional application’: British management of the first attempt to seek 
membership of the EEC, 1961–3’, in Building postwar Europe. National decision-makers and European 





issues.19 The UK’s opposition Labour Party leader, Hugh Gaitskell, in 1962 ‘called for 
a general election before any decision is made’ on EEC membership.20 France under 
President Charles de Gaulle rejected the first British application in 1963.21 Australians 
rejoiced at this outcome; however, only four years later the British submitted their 
second application to join the EEC, which was also rejected by the French. Despite 
having twelve years to adjust, Australia remained ill-prepared for the eventual British 
entry into the EEC (alongside Denmark and Ireland) on 1 January 1973. The Federal 
Government relied on a preferred foreign policy outcome rather than changes in the 
international system. This shows a failure in policy-making and a dangerous delay in 
Australia’s response to changes in the international system and regional integration in 
Europe more specifically. 
Further British EEC applications and accession in 1973 
Nevertheless, when Britain applied again to join the EEC on 2 May 1967, Australian 
policy makers were still dismayed but somewhat better prepared to address this issue 
on several fronts. In 1967, Australia was deeply engaged in trade discussions with 
Japan and the EEC, seeking better market access for its agricultural products 
(including meat, canned and dairy), and primary commodities (such as coal and iron 
ore), and in multilateral trade discussions during the U.S.-driven Kennedy round of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations.22  By that time, 
Australia had already established an embassy in Brussels, led by its first Ambassador 
to the EEC, Sir Edwin McCarthy, an experienced trade negotiator and diplomat who 
served in Brussels until 1964.23 Menzies was no longer Prime Minister, having resigned 
in 1966 after sixteen continuous years in office.24 Despite the attempts to establish 
relations with the EEC, in all international trade forums Australia represented itself as 
a victim of the British EEC application, and argued ardently against the prospect of its 
success.  
By 1967, the EEC had also gained competency as an international trade actor, having 
secured access for many of its members’ products, including dairy, in Southeast Asia. 
The EEC had, by then, become a serious rival to Australia’s commercial interests in the 
Asia-Pacific region. It was unsurprising, if unwise, that Australia’s Minister for Trade 
and Industry, John McEwen, had criticised the new British application for EEC 
membership at every available opportunity. 25  Australian policy-makers’ anti-EEC 
																																																								
19 ‘The Berlin Crisis: 1958-1961’, U.S. Office of the Historian, Department of the State, Government of the United 
States of America, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/berlin-crises (accessed online 20 June 2017). 
20 ‘Menzies in Common Market hoax’, Tribune, 26 September 1962, page 12. 
21 Internal divisions in the UK over the EEC were evident even earlier when the British firstly committed a 
representative to the Messina conference in June 1955, which initiated moves towards the customs union, but 
then the British withdrew. ‘The EEC and Britain’s late entry’, The UK National Archives, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/eec-britains-late-entry.htm (accessed online 21 June 
2017). 
22 ‘Address by J. McEwen (Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry) at National press club 
luncheon’, 1 June 1967, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2FHPR10
002915%22  (accessed online 21 June 2017). 
23 Prior to his Ambassadorial appointment, McCarthy was the Chairmen of the International Wheat Council, and 
in one of his previous roles held the post of Deputy High Commissioner to London. Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, ‘Sir Edwin McCarthy’, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mccarthy-sir-
edwin-10909 (accessed online 21 June 2017). 
24 He retired from politics to allow new generations to lead, with Harold Holt becoming Australia’s next Prime 
Minister (whose term was cut short by his disappearance and presumed drowning in December 1967). 
25 See, for example, ‘Concern on British interest in Market’, The Age, 13 August 1966; ‘Danger to Australia seen in 
U.K. Market move’, 25 October 1966, Daily Telegraph (no page numbers provided) 
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attitude permeated almost every discussion on this topic and dominated Australia’s 
trade agenda that showed no significant signs of maturing until quite late in the 1960s. 
The UK frequently held sectoral consultations with the Commonwealth countries on 
the implications of the British EEC application. On one such occasion during 
consultations on the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, McEwen praised the British 
Prime Minister for specifically mentioning the safeguarding of interests of the 
Commonwealth countries in his speech to the House of Commons when he announced 
the UK’s second application for EEC membership.26 This seemed to be at odds both 
with the EEC's integrationist agenda and showed a lack of full-hearted commitments 
by the British to embrace change. 
It was of little surprise then that the French Government on De Gaulle’s instructions, 
rejected once again the British application, mentioning that Britain would need ‘a 
radical transformation’ before any such application would be seriously considered by 
France.27 De Gaulle cited the British deficiency in the balance of payments as well as 
‘British tradition of obtaining cheap food from all parts of the world’ as reasons for 
French rejection, although geo-strategic reasons could have also been at play. 28 
Australians welcomed the second British failure to enter the EEC, however, political 
debates on this issue did not stop there. The Government once again did little to 
comprehensively consider the issue of British EEC entry, focusing instead on regional 
security matters and the war in Vietnam. 
The Labor Party, which was in opposition until 1973, warned of grave consequences 
for Australian primary industries if the British were to join the EEC even after the 
second French rejection. A prominent Labor Member of Parliament, Ron Davies, gave 
a speech to the Parliament in which he explained in profound detail the consequences 
of the EEC’s trade drive in Australia’s immediate region. He observed that since the 
UK’s first application in 1962, the Australian dairy industry underwent changes with 
limited federal government’s support, and chartered new markets in the Philippines, 
Singapore and Malaysia.29 Davies warned, however, that Australian primary industries 
could not compete in the long run with the EEC’s protectionism and dumping policies, 
nor could Australian companies be a match to Europe’s multinational giants, such as 
Nestle, protected by EEC governments and their policies of export subsidies. The 
situation did not significantly improve even after Britain applied again in 1969, 
following De Gaulle’s resignation. The new government in Paris reversed its position 
upon the third British EEC application, to the shock and bewilderment of most 
Australians who were suddenly faced with the harsh reality of losing a major trading 
partner and export market in particular.  
																																																								
26 ‘Important London sugar talks. Statement by the Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry, 
Mr. John McEwen’, Canberra, 16 June 1967, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2FHPR10
002970%22, (accessed online 21 June 2017) 
27 ‘1967: De Gaulle says 'non' to Britain–again’, BBC, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/27/newsid_4187000/4187714.stm (accessed online 
21 June 2017)  
28 Nesta Roberts, ‘Emphatic no by de Gaulle’, 29 November 1967, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/1967/nov/28/eu.france (accessed online 21 June 2017) 
29 ‘Processed milk products bounty bill 1968’, Hansard, House of the Representatives, 14 November 1968, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2





When Britain joined the EEC under Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath on 1 
January 1973, most Australians felt abandoned, betrayed and isolated. The enlarged 
EEC was a threat to Australian primary industries, even though Australia and the EEC 
signed their first agreement under G.A.T.T. auspices in 1968. Although Australians had 
more than a decade to prepare for the eventuality of the UK succeeding in its intent to 
join the EEC, it was a profound shock with negative consequences for the Australian 
economy. The export of Australian butter fell by ninety per cent in the year following 
the end of the Commonwealth preferential agreements with the UK. In all areas in 
which Australia previously enjoyed special status under the Commonwealth Imperial 
Preferences system, such as in the sugar and dairy industries but not limited to them, 
Australian trade declined. The international oil market crisis only added to Australia’s 
financial troubles. The new Australian Government elected in late 1972 under Labor 
Party leader Gough Whitlam, began to explore new markets such as the People’s 
Republic of China, which Australia officially recognised and with which Australia 
entered into trade agreements. Whitlam also dismantled the last remnants of the 
White Australia immigration policy, ending existing immigration agreements with 
Great Britain and selected European countries.30 
It can be argued that the British EEC accession of 1973 was a major political and 
economic watershed moment for Australia. Continued protectionism by the EEC 
galvanised the Australian Government, opposition and industry bodies (at state and 
federal levels) to become more pro-active in international trade. The Whitlam 
Government agreed on a consultative ministerial framework with the EEC in 1974. The 
relationship with the UK, however, did not become a thing of the past. Both London 
and Canberra were well-aware of the need to change the terms of reference of their 
long-standing and continuing relationship. Careful planning by the Australian 
Government for UK's EEC entry could have protected Australian interests in Europe 
better.   
The first Brexit referendum and Australian political discourses 
The British Labour Government of Harold Wilson, which was elected in 1974, 
honoured their electoral promise by holding a national referendum on continued EEC 
membership in 1975. The referendum split the British cabinet, whilst the opposition’s 
conservatives advocated for a ‘yes’ vote (to remain in the EEC).31 The results were 
astonishing as 32.8 per cent of the voters opted to leave the EEC, whilst more than 
double that number, 67.2 per cent, voted for continued membership. 32  Wilson 
described the result as a ‘historical decision’.33 The Australian Government supported 
a ‘yes’ vote, with Prime Minister Whitlam stating a month before the referendum that 
																																																								
30 ‘The changing face of modern Australia: 1950s to 1970s’, Australian government website, 
http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/changing-face-of-modern-australia-1950s-to-
1970s (accessed online 21 June 2017) 
31 ’26 April 1975: Labour votes to leave the EEC’, BBC, no date provided, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/26/newsid_2503000/2503155.stm(accessed online 24 
June 2017). 
32Vaughne Miller, ‘The UK in the European Union: in brief’, 15 December 2014, House of Commons Library, 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN07060/SN07060.pdf (accessed online 24 June 2017) 
33 ‘6 June 1975: UK embraces Europe in referendum’, BBC, no date provided, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/6/newsid_2499000/2499297.stm (accessed online 24 
June 2017). 
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there would be no advantage to Australia in Britain withdrawing from the EEC.34 Prime 
Minister Whitlam showed support for his British counterpart throughout the 
referendum campaign, which stood in stark contrast to his predecessors’ attitudes in 
1962, 1967 and 1969. Whitlam believed that Wilson's Government truly cared for the 
Commonwealth nations’ interests inside the EEC, and that it was an ally of Australia’s 
inside the Common Market. This was also a time when Australia was about to purchase 
Western European technology to build uranium enrichment plants and needed British 
support from within the EEC.35 An agreement from EURATOM countries, including 
the UK, was essential for this to happen. The 'special relationship' between the UK and 
Australia continued despite the trend of Australian exports suffering quite badly in the 
immediate years after Britain joined the EEC. If the Australian Government had made 
preparations early enough for that scenario, it would not have been a disloyal ally but 
rather a nation that looked after Australian interests in Europe with pragmatic 
foresight and readiness for major changes in that region which were already in the 
making. The Australian Government today should draw on the lessons from the 1960s 
and early 1970s and prepare better this time around before Brexit negotiations are 
finalised.  
Ahead of the 230th anniversary since the UK's First Fleet arrived in Sydney, the 
relationship between Australia and Britain, as well as ties with the EU are being re-
assessed. There are many challenges for Australian commercial interests in Europe, 
such as what appears to be a disintegrating and reforming EU.36 The unprecedented 
process for Brexit formally began when the British Prime Minister notified the 
President of the European Council of Britain’s intention to leave the European Union 
in March 2017, invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty for the first time in its short 
history. 37  These negotiations, which can only be tough and cumbersome, need to 
provide some definitive answers to the question of British separation from the EU after 
more than four decades since the British joined. 
The final settlement of the divorce between London and Brussels will directly affect 
Australia’s relationship with the UK. Ben Wellings argues that it would be against 
Australia’s interests to get caught up in Britain’s post-imperial ‘fantasies’ at the time 
																																																								
34 ‘Prime Minister’s press conference Kingston’, press release, 9 May 1975, p. 6, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2FHPR07
000317%22 (accessed online 24 June 2017). 
35 ‘Conferences: 31st Federal Conference of the Australian Labor Party, Terrigal, NSW: Minutes and committee 
reports’, 3 February 1975, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22library%2Fpartypol%2F15131
79%22 (accessed online 24 June 2017). 
36 For an in-depth historical overview of Australia’s relationship with the European Union, see Nina Markovic, 
‘Courted by Europe? Advancing Australia’s relations with the European Union in the new security environment‘, 
Parliamentary Library Research Service, Commonwealth of Australia, 14 July 2009, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22library%2Fprspub%2F4N4U6
%22, (accessed online 24 June 2017); Nina Markovic ‘Australia’s evolving relationship with the European Union: 
an update’, Parliamentary Library Research Service, Commonwealth of Australia, 25 October 2012, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22library%2Fprspub%2F200102
5%22 (accessed online 24 June 2017), and Nina Markovic, ‘Australia’s relations with the European Union: 
towards a deeper regional engagement’, Briefing Book for the 44th Parliament, Parliamentary Library Research 
Service, Commonwealth of Australia, December 2013, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingB
ook44p/AustEU (accessed online 24 June 2017). 
37 Parliamentary Library’s Research Service, ‘Brexit: Article 50 and beyond’, Commonwealth of Australia, 18 April 
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April/BrexitArticle_50_and_beyond (accessed online 19 June 2017) For details of the Lisbon Treaty, see Treaty of 





when Australia is ready to commence its long-sought negotiations on an FTA with the 
European Union.38 However, Australia risks becoming embroiled in its own 'fantasies' 
in the foreign policy realm, and not preparing its citizens once again for a major event 
in international politics, in this case Brexit. The release of a new Foreign Policy White 
Paper, promised for mid-2017, has not occurred at the time of this writing. However, 
the new White Paper (the first since 2003, as opposed to the more regular Defence 
White Papers) has the potential to provide some clarity and even a roadmap for 
Australians interested in transforming the nation’s relationship with Europe. 
																																																								
38 Ben Wellings, ‘As Brexit begins, Australia mustn’t get caught up in Britain’s post-imperial fantasies’, 29 March 
2017, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/as-brexit-begins-australia-mustnt-get-caught-up-in-
britains-post-imperial-fantasies-74918 (accessed online 21 June 2017). 
